I don't remember the source, but it argued that knights as cavalry became ineffective long before the advent of mounted gunners, (somewhere around the 12th C?). Foot soldiers were able to stop them, but for some reason it didn't catch on entirely for quite awhile.
Any thoughts/info?
Ineffectiveness of Knightly Cavalry
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Syrus Leigh
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I've always thought the primary strength of the cavalry (even the heavy cavalry) was mobility. Mounted forces can get there the fustest with the mostest and they can go around obstacles (opposing forces) too strong to go through.
The cavalry charge, like the bayonet charge, is primarily a terror weapon.
The cavalry charge, like the bayonet charge, is primarily a terror weapon.
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This may take a bit of explanation, but the domination of battlefields by the armored knight in the middle ages is sort of a historical aberration, since except for those few hundred years heavy infantry has always been capable of standing up to heavy cavalry. Some scholars argue that it was the invention of the stirrup that made Heavy cavalry so effective, but i subscribe to a different school of thought.
Briefly, in order for heavy infantry to resist the charge of heavy cavalry, they must be well trained, have good dicipline, and high morale. They also must be armed and armored in one of two ways. Either they must be heavily armored and carry melee weapons suitable for attacking a mounted man, or they can be lightly armored and carry a very long weapon thats designed to keep the enemy horseman from being able to reach them with a weapon as long as they are in a solid formation. During the middle ages, dismounted armored knights were able to fulfill the first example occasionally with varying results. They generally lacked the discipline necessary to act offensively as infantry, so most of the sucess stories of the dismounted Knight are while fighting a defensive battle. The second type of heavy infantry i mentioned was typical of what a citizen levy might produce, but such levies almost always lacked all three of the necessities to face heavy cavalry, and thus were basically only capable of holding a solid defensive position on the field. Lacking disciplin and training such formations were completely incapable of taking any sort of offensive action without their formation completely falling apart(making them vulnerable to cavalry). Lacking high morale, they were very prone to panic and flight, especially if the battle didnt seem to be going well. From what I've read, in most cases the foot troops were considered so unreliable that they were often detailed to guard the camp and didnt even actively participate in the battle. Now, this ony applies to heavy infantry. Light infantry on the order of archers and crossbowmen were employed extensively, but such troops have an auxilliary role, and werent intended to bear the brunt of the fighting in a battle in most cases.
That all changed with the rise of the Swiss Pikeman. Their culture was such that almost every man was trained to use a pike and to manuever in formation with it. Accounts I've read suggest that they started learning with toy pikes as children, and by the time they reached the age for war they were already fairly well trained. In addition, each cantons troops grew up together, knew each other well, and drilled together to the point that they had an unheard of morale and esprit de corps in comparison to any other foot troops that had been seen for better then 500 years. Once the Swiss showed how it was done, other nations copied them. Combine these new heavy infantry with gunpowder weapons that could penetrate plate and that any moron could be taught to use relatively quickly, and heavy cavalry ceases to be much of a threat.
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Otto von Aachen
Kingdom of the Outlands, Canton of Hawks Hollow
Briefly, in order for heavy infantry to resist the charge of heavy cavalry, they must be well trained, have good dicipline, and high morale. They also must be armed and armored in one of two ways. Either they must be heavily armored and carry melee weapons suitable for attacking a mounted man, or they can be lightly armored and carry a very long weapon thats designed to keep the enemy horseman from being able to reach them with a weapon as long as they are in a solid formation. During the middle ages, dismounted armored knights were able to fulfill the first example occasionally with varying results. They generally lacked the discipline necessary to act offensively as infantry, so most of the sucess stories of the dismounted Knight are while fighting a defensive battle. The second type of heavy infantry i mentioned was typical of what a citizen levy might produce, but such levies almost always lacked all three of the necessities to face heavy cavalry, and thus were basically only capable of holding a solid defensive position on the field. Lacking disciplin and training such formations were completely incapable of taking any sort of offensive action without their formation completely falling apart(making them vulnerable to cavalry). Lacking high morale, they were very prone to panic and flight, especially if the battle didnt seem to be going well. From what I've read, in most cases the foot troops were considered so unreliable that they were often detailed to guard the camp and didnt even actively participate in the battle. Now, this ony applies to heavy infantry. Light infantry on the order of archers and crossbowmen were employed extensively, but such troops have an auxilliary role, and werent intended to bear the brunt of the fighting in a battle in most cases.
That all changed with the rise of the Swiss Pikeman. Their culture was such that almost every man was trained to use a pike and to manuever in formation with it. Accounts I've read suggest that they started learning with toy pikes as children, and by the time they reached the age for war they were already fairly well trained. In addition, each cantons troops grew up together, knew each other well, and drilled together to the point that they had an unheard of morale and esprit de corps in comparison to any other foot troops that had been seen for better then 500 years. Once the Swiss showed how it was done, other nations copied them. Combine these new heavy infantry with gunpowder weapons that could penetrate plate and that any moron could be taught to use relatively quickly, and heavy cavalry ceases to be much of a threat.
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Otto von Aachen
Kingdom of the Outlands, Canton of Hawks Hollow
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JJ Shred
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Try substituting 16th C. for 12th - they were in their hey-day in the 12th & 13th C. Guns were introduced in the 14th, but used mounted more into the middle of the 16th.
My cut-off is the battle of Pavia, 1525, when Charles was pulled off his horse by halberdiers, the Swiss & German square pike formations with 18' pikes were active, and guns were common on the ground.
While heavy cavalry faded, light cavalry remained in use until WWI.
My cut-off is the battle of Pavia, 1525, when Charles was pulled off his horse by halberdiers, the Swiss & German square pike formations with 18' pikes were active, and guns were common on the ground.
While heavy cavalry faded, light cavalry remained in use until WWI.
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Bascot, you better not let any cuirassiers hear you call them light cavalry. Infantry can deploy far more weapons along their frontage than cavalry, but the ground is shaking and the horses are huge and you know they will not stop, so run for it and now the cavalry is completly effective.
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Greetings!
Disciplined infantry can withstand heavy cavalry, provided they hold formation. Look at Senlac Ridge in 1066. It took archers and feigned retreeat to break up the English shieldwall so that the Norman cavalry could sucessfully attack them. Cavalry's great strength is its mobilty and physcological impact.
Slainte,
Fearghus
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Disciplined infantry can withstand heavy cavalry, provided they hold formation. Look at Senlac Ridge in 1066. It took archers and feigned retreeat to break up the English shieldwall so that the Norman cavalry could sucessfully attack them. Cavalry's great strength is its mobilty and physcological impact.
Slainte,
Fearghus
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"How long will we fight? We will fight until hell freezes
over. Then we fight on the ice."
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Vitus von Atzinger
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I agreed with Edmund Greyfox's opinions for the most part...except the origin of drill and cermonies...i.e., coordinated field movements as a unit body.
This approach to tactical troop movements was not developed by pikemen, but by archers, most notably the Englsh and Welsh longbowmen. Pikemen copied them after the units of archers' methods were shown to be efficient ways of regrouping, advancing, retreating, and the like. Since pikemen were often stationed around the archers as a means of defense...the two groups had to learn to manuever around each other without falling apart....but it was the archers who could stay in one locale and still attack their enemies at length. Thus it was they who had need to redeploy and reposition themselves to take offensive advantage of the vagaries of battle, or to act defensively to shore up weaknesses in their own lines, or to change targets at will.
The Pikemen manuevered around them to keep them safe, but their movements were, as Edmund Greyfox said, primarily defensive at first.
It was the movements of the archers that became the basis for modern D&C (drill and ceremonies). It was copied in turn by crossbowmen, arquebusiers and musketeers, and later longrifleman in King George's army. All their movements were the same as historical archers, because their primary weapons worked in the same way; they were ranged weapons that were fired in volley.
If you have ever wondered why the troops in the revolutionary war stood in long rows in the middle of an open field...now you know. They did ti because that was the way it had always been done. They did it to maximize the effectiveness of their primary weapons, the rifle...whose level of inaccuracy and pitiful reloading speed was a severe handicpa in any but the most clear feild conditions. The rifles of the day had to fired in volley so as to increase the chances that your troops would hit something. Of course it helped if your troops were packed extremely close together and concentrated their fire on the same places. Of course the act of grouping your troops close together made it easier for your oppnent to concentrate fire on you with an increased cahnce of hittiing something...but that was the tradeoff.
If your troops' discipline was better, you usually won.
Fighting in the woods was a horrible disadvantage. Since you couldn't see very far, you couldn't shoot very far, and since the rifles were so inaccurate and your troops would have a hard time grouping close enought together to fire in volley...that means that the first shot is probably going to miss. Since it took even the best trained man almots 14 seconds ot reload his rifle...and his visibility in the woods was linted to much less than the ground an enemy could cover in that time....in effect that meant that in the woods you got off only one shot, and then it was down to hand to hand combat. Discipline would be shot, and the your superiority in numbers or the quality of your gear made no difference. It became a crap shoot.
So...D&C was the standard. Group together in large bodies. Pick the land for the battle ahead of time. Make your enemy come to you, and leave yourself plenty of room and time to shoot. These are all archer's precepts, this is how archers think....not pikemen.
This approach to tactical troop movements was not developed by pikemen, but by archers, most notably the Englsh and Welsh longbowmen. Pikemen copied them after the units of archers' methods were shown to be efficient ways of regrouping, advancing, retreating, and the like. Since pikemen were often stationed around the archers as a means of defense...the two groups had to learn to manuever around each other without falling apart....but it was the archers who could stay in one locale and still attack their enemies at length. Thus it was they who had need to redeploy and reposition themselves to take offensive advantage of the vagaries of battle, or to act defensively to shore up weaknesses in their own lines, or to change targets at will.
The Pikemen manuevered around them to keep them safe, but their movements were, as Edmund Greyfox said, primarily defensive at first.
It was the movements of the archers that became the basis for modern D&C (drill and ceremonies). It was copied in turn by crossbowmen, arquebusiers and musketeers, and later longrifleman in King George's army. All their movements were the same as historical archers, because their primary weapons worked in the same way; they were ranged weapons that were fired in volley.
If you have ever wondered why the troops in the revolutionary war stood in long rows in the middle of an open field...now you know. They did ti because that was the way it had always been done. They did it to maximize the effectiveness of their primary weapons, the rifle...whose level of inaccuracy and pitiful reloading speed was a severe handicpa in any but the most clear feild conditions. The rifles of the day had to fired in volley so as to increase the chances that your troops would hit something. Of course it helped if your troops were packed extremely close together and concentrated their fire on the same places. Of course the act of grouping your troops close together made it easier for your oppnent to concentrate fire on you with an increased cahnce of hittiing something...but that was the tradeoff.
If your troops' discipline was better, you usually won.
Fighting in the woods was a horrible disadvantage. Since you couldn't see very far, you couldn't shoot very far, and since the rifles were so inaccurate and your troops would have a hard time grouping close enought together to fire in volley...that means that the first shot is probably going to miss. Since it took even the best trained man almots 14 seconds ot reload his rifle...and his visibility in the woods was linted to much less than the ground an enemy could cover in that time....in effect that meant that in the woods you got off only one shot, and then it was down to hand to hand combat. Discipline would be shot, and the your superiority in numbers or the quality of your gear made no difference. It became a crap shoot.
So...D&C was the standard. Group together in large bodies. Pick the land for the battle ahead of time. Make your enemy come to you, and leave yourself plenty of room and time to shoot. These are all archer's precepts, this is how archers think....not pikemen.
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I think that the biggest danger to cavalry, and the thing that forced cavalry to become a relatively minor part of the medieval combined-arms team, was the archer. Even the best barding leaves a lot of pretty large gaps, and an arrow storm certainly can madden and possibly kill a *lot* of horse... as the French learned to their dismay at Crecy (which is why they dimounted for most of the other battles of the HYW).
Bob Reed argues that armored cavalry was the decisive arm of battle in the later middle ages, after the temporary "aberration" of the HYW was over, but that doesn't seem true in England. Everything I've read of about the *major* battles of the Wars of the Roses shows that the *majority* of soldiers on the field were infantry for most battles (Bob: I'm not saying all!); for example, in _The Medieval Soldier, by Andrew Boardman, we are told that the English during the Wars of the Roses customarily dismounted their nobility and kept the horse back for use in a pursuit of a rout (p. 179). Later, Boardman talks about Richard's charge down the slopes of Ambien Hill, and says:
We can learn several things from this: First, that infantry (I say "infantry" rather than just bowmen because I don't know the extent to which it is, in fact, the bowmen that were the sole problem) was considered too dangerous to charge unless they were disordered (we saw he same thing during the HYW, for example, at Poitiers, where the Englis held a unit of cavalry in reserve for just this sort of action). Second, we learn that the men-at-arms *normally* fought on foot, *not* on horseback, and third we learn that cavalry charges were rare and unusual things in the WoR.
I think this has to do with a number of factors:
-The effects of missle weapons on horses
-It was cheaper to put a few peasants with missle or pole weapons in the field than it was to put a mounted knight, and the former could defeat the latter (and most often did)
-National armies were easier to raise from peasants than from landholders, and with the increased numbers you needed the nobility for an officerial class.
Now I honestly don't know what the rest of Europe was doing vis-a-vis cavalry during the 15th century, and it would be interesting to contrast the English experience with more continental battles since on the continent the longbow was not as common (in spite of many English archers serving as mercenaries there). Looking in Osprey's _Armies of Medieval Burgundy_ (I know, I know, but my copy of Contamine is missing!) on page 13 we see a ToE for an army from 1417. In this table, out of 900 total Burgundian troops, 600 are mounted and 300 on foot, but 300 of the mounted troops are archers, who presumably fought on foot, making the disposition of troops 600 infantry and 300 cavalry (presuming the cavalry actually fought on horseback).
There's an interesting anecdote here also about the Battle of Brustem, 28 October 1267. Apparently, one side held out a large force of cavalry with which it charged the opposing infantry, but:
Then the archers continued to advance, but soon ran out of arrows (archers really *do* need to fight from defensive positions for full effect); when the defenders noticed this, they came out of their defensive positions and attacked, so the Duke ordered his remaining men at arms to dismount, and these dismounted men at arms put the defenders to route with high casualties (p. 24-25).
From these snippets, we see several things: Not only infantry, but terrain can be a real factor in making cavalry less useful (as the French learned in Flanders in the early HYW). Moreover, it would seem that cavalry was a larger portion of the armies in question on the continent than they were in England; can this be atrributable to the lower proportion of archers? Presumably, however, the cavalry must have often been fairly effective during these wars or the Burgundians wouldn't have kept so many men on horseback. It's ver interesting, however, to note that when the defenders attacked, the Duke's troops were ordered to *dismount* to fight them! I would sure love to know why he did that.
Then there's the Swiss and Germans, who apparently fought almost entirely on foot. I don't know; was it only the Burgundians who had so many heavy cavalry? What were the Italians doing (things there are so mixed up because of the nature of Italian "armies")? It seems like a lot of condottieri were mounted, but they were supplemented by a lot of foot, too; I just don't know enough about that.
Also, of course, all the sources I've read talk about using cavalry to chase the side that routs; Boardman says that in some WoR battles the casualties inflicted during the rout exceeded the casualties of the battle prior to the rout.
Cavalry *always* remained useful, and was so even in the HYW, which is usually thought of as an entirely infantry war (in combat, I mean). But well-disciplined infantry could usually defeat it, and terrain could deny it, making cavalry less valuable for the main body of troops.
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Hugh Knight
"Welcome to the Church of the Open Field, let us 'prey': Hunt hard, kill swiftly, waste nothing, make no apologies"
[This message has been edited by SyrRhys (edited 07-19-2002).]
Bob Reed argues that armored cavalry was the decisive arm of battle in the later middle ages, after the temporary "aberration" of the HYW was over, but that doesn't seem true in England. Everything I've read of about the *major* battles of the Wars of the Roses shows that the *majority* of soldiers on the field were infantry for most battles (Bob: I'm not saying all!); for example, in _The Medieval Soldier, by Andrew Boardman, we are told that the English during the Wars of the Roses customarily dismounted their nobility and kept the horse back for use in a pursuit of a rout (p. 179). Later, Boardman talks about Richard's charge down the slopes of Ambien Hill, and says:
<font face="Verdana, Arial" size="2">"...it also proves that cavalry charges were still contemplated on the War of the Roses battlefield in desperate situations (Italics mine--HTK). Although English knights more often than not fought on foot during this period, we do know from contemporary sources of isolated incidents when cavalry were used to deliver 'shock" to the enemy for a variety of reasons... If placed well away from longbowmen, or if cavalry could charge when archers were already committed to the confusion of hand-to-hand combat, then a spirited cavalry attack could turn a battle upside down."</font>
We can learn several things from this: First, that infantry (I say "infantry" rather than just bowmen because I don't know the extent to which it is, in fact, the bowmen that were the sole problem) was considered too dangerous to charge unless they were disordered (we saw he same thing during the HYW, for example, at Poitiers, where the Englis held a unit of cavalry in reserve for just this sort of action). Second, we learn that the men-at-arms *normally* fought on foot, *not* on horseback, and third we learn that cavalry charges were rare and unusual things in the WoR.
I think this has to do with a number of factors:
-The effects of missle weapons on horses
-It was cheaper to put a few peasants with missle or pole weapons in the field than it was to put a mounted knight, and the former could defeat the latter (and most often did)
-National armies were easier to raise from peasants than from landholders, and with the increased numbers you needed the nobility for an officerial class.
Now I honestly don't know what the rest of Europe was doing vis-a-vis cavalry during the 15th century, and it would be interesting to contrast the English experience with more continental battles since on the continent the longbow was not as common (in spite of many English archers serving as mercenaries there). Looking in Osprey's _Armies of Medieval Burgundy_ (I know, I know, but my copy of Contamine is missing!) on page 13 we see a ToE for an army from 1417. In this table, out of 900 total Burgundian troops, 600 are mounted and 300 on foot, but 300 of the mounted troops are archers, who presumably fought on foot, making the disposition of troops 600 infantry and 300 cavalry (presuming the cavalry actually fought on horseback).
There's an interesting anecdote here also about the Battle of Brustem, 28 October 1267. Apparently, one side held out a large force of cavalry with which it charged the opposing infantry, but:
<font face="Verdana, Arial" size="2">"The mounted men at arms on the wings tried to charge with the archers, but were almost immediately halted by the rough terrain, not to mention the defender's artillery"</font>
Then the archers continued to advance, but soon ran out of arrows (archers really *do* need to fight from defensive positions for full effect); when the defenders noticed this, they came out of their defensive positions and attacked, so the Duke ordered his remaining men at arms to dismount, and these dismounted men at arms put the defenders to route with high casualties (p. 24-25).
From these snippets, we see several things: Not only infantry, but terrain can be a real factor in making cavalry less useful (as the French learned in Flanders in the early HYW). Moreover, it would seem that cavalry was a larger portion of the armies in question on the continent than they were in England; can this be atrributable to the lower proportion of archers? Presumably, however, the cavalry must have often been fairly effective during these wars or the Burgundians wouldn't have kept so many men on horseback. It's ver interesting, however, to note that when the defenders attacked, the Duke's troops were ordered to *dismount* to fight them! I would sure love to know why he did that.
Then there's the Swiss and Germans, who apparently fought almost entirely on foot. I don't know; was it only the Burgundians who had so many heavy cavalry? What were the Italians doing (things there are so mixed up because of the nature of Italian "armies")? It seems like a lot of condottieri were mounted, but they were supplemented by a lot of foot, too; I just don't know enough about that.
Also, of course, all the sources I've read talk about using cavalry to chase the side that routs; Boardman says that in some WoR battles the casualties inflicted during the rout exceeded the casualties of the battle prior to the rout.
Cavalry *always* remained useful, and was so even in the HYW, which is usually thought of as an entirely infantry war (in combat, I mean). But well-disciplined infantry could usually defeat it, and terrain could deny it, making cavalry less valuable for the main body of troops.
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Hugh Knight
"Welcome to the Church of the Open Field, let us 'prey': Hunt hard, kill swiftly, waste nothing, make no apologies"
[This message has been edited by SyrRhys (edited 07-19-2002).]
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Abaddon,
You make a good point regarding drill and ceremony being based on the movement of the archers, but i tend to think that they were actually based on the works of Vegetus and other surviving Greek and Roman writings that were the basis of many commanders tactics and strategies. I also still hold to the position that those archers would have been easily overrun by heavy cavalry if they didn't have either the support of the heavy infantry, or as Rhys pointed out, a terrain advantage that made the charge of heavy cavalry unfeasible. If you think of it in terms of weapons systems, the early middle ages didn't embrace the concept of a true combined arms force that was mutually supporting. Most Western European armies seem to have had good-excellent heavy cavalry, adequate-excellent light infantry, totally inadequate heavy infantry, and light cavalry seem to be almost completely absent from most western armies. So, when you get down to it, throughout the early middle ages, heavy cavalry and light infantry were the only truly useful troops available. Without heavy infantry to protect them, light infantry couldn't play a decisive role in an open field battle, so the heavy cavalry ruled the battlefield. The reinvention of a professional heavy infantry towards the end of the middle ages altered the formula, allowing heavy infantry to not only support the advance of the light infantry, but to also take decisive offensive action of it's own accord while being supported by the light infantry.
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Otto von Aachen
Kingdom of the Outlands, Canton of Hawks Hollow
You make a good point regarding drill and ceremony being based on the movement of the archers, but i tend to think that they were actually based on the works of Vegetus and other surviving Greek and Roman writings that were the basis of many commanders tactics and strategies. I also still hold to the position that those archers would have been easily overrun by heavy cavalry if they didn't have either the support of the heavy infantry, or as Rhys pointed out, a terrain advantage that made the charge of heavy cavalry unfeasible. If you think of it in terms of weapons systems, the early middle ages didn't embrace the concept of a true combined arms force that was mutually supporting. Most Western European armies seem to have had good-excellent heavy cavalry, adequate-excellent light infantry, totally inadequate heavy infantry, and light cavalry seem to be almost completely absent from most western armies. So, when you get down to it, throughout the early middle ages, heavy cavalry and light infantry were the only truly useful troops available. Without heavy infantry to protect them, light infantry couldn't play a decisive role in an open field battle, so the heavy cavalry ruled the battlefield. The reinvention of a professional heavy infantry towards the end of the middle ages altered the formula, allowing heavy infantry to not only support the advance of the light infantry, but to also take decisive offensive action of it's own accord while being supported by the light infantry.
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Otto von Aachen
Kingdom of the Outlands, Canton of Hawks Hollow
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Hi Rhys,
The Swiss fought almost entirely on foot. This is due to the nature of the Confederation as a political and social entity, and the paucity of nobility to fill out a cavalry. There were Swiss knights, they were few, and when they were employed militarily, it was as a small cavalry reserve - the Swiss had a plentitude of enthusiastic and trained heavy infantry that required no "stiffening" of dismounted men at arms to aide them. You don't read much about the Swiss nobility, as they were so few as to be rarely engaged, as they were heavily outnumbered by their opposite numbers, even when their opponents only had modest numbers of cavalry.
It is interesting to note the Confederates (as in Swiss) were unable to inflict a decisive defeat on the Burgundians until their allies provided large contingents of men at arms because without the heavy cavalry to follow up, they lacked the ability to turn a reverse into a rout as the Burgundians had plenty of men at arms to deny thm the ability to run down the other elelments of the army..
The Germans in large part fought mounted. During the Hussite wars, after initial engagments they attemptd a variety of tactics, but by mid century they were principly mounted again (a very brief interruption of practise), and did so straight through the Renaissance.
At Brustem the Dukes men at arms dismounted to engage as they had to fight over unsuitable ground - the Liegois advanced to engage over the very broken ground that had prevented a successful cavalry contact in the earlier stage of the battle.
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Bob R.
The Swiss fought almost entirely on foot. This is due to the nature of the Confederation as a political and social entity, and the paucity of nobility to fill out a cavalry. There were Swiss knights, they were few, and when they were employed militarily, it was as a small cavalry reserve - the Swiss had a plentitude of enthusiastic and trained heavy infantry that required no "stiffening" of dismounted men at arms to aide them. You don't read much about the Swiss nobility, as they were so few as to be rarely engaged, as they were heavily outnumbered by their opposite numbers, even when their opponents only had modest numbers of cavalry.
It is interesting to note the Confederates (as in Swiss) were unable to inflict a decisive defeat on the Burgundians until their allies provided large contingents of men at arms because without the heavy cavalry to follow up, they lacked the ability to turn a reverse into a rout as the Burgundians had plenty of men at arms to deny thm the ability to run down the other elelments of the army..
The Germans in large part fought mounted. During the Hussite wars, after initial engagments they attemptd a variety of tactics, but by mid century they were principly mounted again (a very brief interruption of practise), and did so straight through the Renaissance.
At Brustem the Dukes men at arms dismounted to engage as they had to fight over unsuitable ground - the Liegois advanced to engage over the very broken ground that had prevented a successful cavalry contact in the earlier stage of the battle.
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Bob R.
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SyrRhys
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<BLOCKQUOTE><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><HR><font face="Verdana, Arial" size="2">Originally posted by chef de chambre:
It is interesting to note the Confederates (as in Swiss) were unable to inflict a decisive defeat on the Burgundians until their allies provided large contingents of men at arms because without the heavy cavalry to follow up, they lacked the ability to turn a reverse into a rout as the Burgundians had plenty of men at arms to deny thm the ability to run down the other elelments of the army..</font><HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
That's interesting, I didn't actually know that. I had heard that the Swiss often kicked Burgundian butt, right from the start. Was I misinformed? As you have pointedly pointed out, I don't read much about this period.
I hope you didn't think I was saying anything different than this.
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Hugh Knight
"Welcome to the Church of the Open Field, let us 'prey': Hunt hard, kill swiftly, waste nothing, make no apologies"
It is interesting to note the Confederates (as in Swiss) were unable to inflict a decisive defeat on the Burgundians until their allies provided large contingents of men at arms because without the heavy cavalry to follow up, they lacked the ability to turn a reverse into a rout as the Burgundians had plenty of men at arms to deny thm the ability to run down the other elelments of the army..</font><HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
That's interesting, I didn't actually know that. I had heard that the Swiss often kicked Burgundian butt, right from the start. Was I misinformed? As you have pointedly pointed out, I don't read much about this period.
<font face="Verdana, Arial" size="2">At Brustem the Dukes men at arms dismounted to engage as they had to fight over unsuitable ground - the Liegois advanced to engage over the very broken ground that had prevented a successful cavalry contact in the earlier stage of the battle.</font>
I hope you didn't think I was saying anything different than this.
------------------
Hugh Knight
"Welcome to the Church of the Open Field, let us 'prey': Hunt hard, kill swiftly, waste nothing, make no apologies"
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FrauHirsch
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<BLOCKQUOTE><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><HR><font face="Verdana, Arial" size="2">Originally posted by SyrRhys:
<B>
Then there's the Swiss and Germans, who apparently fought almost entirely on foot
</B></font><HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
The Germans still used both light and heavy cavalry during the 16th c, throughout the era of the Landsknecht and beyond.
The German footsolders were not normally "knightly class" guys, though some may have been artillery and field commanders. There were also guys that do not appear to be "knights" depicted as cavalry. At least they are dressed more poorly and have less armor.
(I'm referring to late 15th, and throughout the 16th c. Germany specifically.)
Juliana
[This message has been edited by FrauHirsch (edited 07-19-2002).]
<B>
Then there's the Swiss and Germans, who apparently fought almost entirely on foot
</B></font><HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
The Germans still used both light and heavy cavalry during the 16th c, throughout the era of the Landsknecht and beyond.
The German footsolders were not normally "knightly class" guys, though some may have been artillery and field commanders. There were also guys that do not appear to be "knights" depicted as cavalry. At least they are dressed more poorly and have less armor.
(I'm referring to late 15th, and throughout the 16th c. Germany specifically.)
Juliana
[This message has been edited by FrauHirsch (edited 07-19-2002).]
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SyrRhys
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<BLOCKQUOTE><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><HR><font face="Verdana, Arial" size="2">Originally posted by FrauHirsch:
<B> The Germans still used both light and heavy cavalry during the 16th c, throughout the era of the Landsknecht and beyond.
The German footsolders were not normally "knightly class" guys, though some may have been artillery and field commanders. There were also guys that do not appear to be "knights" depicted as cavalry. At least they are dressed more poorly and have less armor.
</B></font><HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
I knew they still had cavalry units, but it was the massed infantry formations of pike and guns that made me think the Germans mostly fought on foot; I wasn't referring to just men at arms, but rather the composition of the *entire* army.
------------------
Hugh Knight
"Welcome to the Church of the Open Field, let us 'prey': Hunt hard, kill swiftly, waste nothing, make no apologies"
<B> The Germans still used both light and heavy cavalry during the 16th c, throughout the era of the Landsknecht and beyond.
The German footsolders were not normally "knightly class" guys, though some may have been artillery and field commanders. There were also guys that do not appear to be "knights" depicted as cavalry. At least they are dressed more poorly and have less armor.
</B></font><HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
I knew they still had cavalry units, but it was the massed infantry formations of pike and guns that made me think the Germans mostly fought on foot; I wasn't referring to just men at arms, but rather the composition of the *entire* army.
------------------
Hugh Knight
"Welcome to the Church of the Open Field, let us 'prey': Hunt hard, kill swiftly, waste nothing, make no apologies"
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chef de chambre
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Hi Rhys,
By decisive victory, I mean a battle by which the winning force so damages the enemy that they are realisticaly unable to engage him after that point (as Agincourt and Poiters were to the French)
In example Grandson - not a decisive victory for the confederates, as the entire Burgundian army disengaged relatively unscathed - due to the mass of disciplined cavalry able to counterattack to prevent the decimation of their infantry.
At Grandson, the confederates were actually losing - half their army engaged, the rest off foraging, and being manouvered into a situation where they were trapped against the lake , and pinned in place (this was effected by luring them off of a hill, and onto the plain - they were supremely arrogant in their confidence), and then pinned in place by cavalry charges - one of which punched a hole into their formation, the Swiss commander considering that to be the direst point of the battle, all the while being pecked away at by the Burgundian crossbows and hangonnes skirmishing.
What caused the loss for the Burgundians was at a critical juncture - a third of the cavalry moving to the rear of the household guard, giving the Burgundian field guns the room to move into position to batter the Swiss block to pieces. At that critical moment of manouver, the rest of the Swiss army started to filter in on the previously mentioned emminence, and in conjunction with the cavalry moving to the rear, the campfollowers saw this and shouted "Save Yourselves - all is lost", and ran away (wagoners cutting horses out of wagon traces and galloping off and the like), then the infantry caught the panick and ran. The cavalry was able to stave off the Swiss, and protect the rest of th army while it ran, and as a result, the only significant losses were the loss of the abandoned artillery, and the tents - which unfortunately for Charles were stuffed with valuables. Well under a thousand Burgundian casualties in all, and over 400 losses admitted to by the Swiss - who regularly under-reported, or did not report at all their losses.
It says much for the logistical capabilities of the Burgundians, that they were able to field as large, or larger army a few months later at Morat, with just as large an artillery park. Unfortunately for the Burgundians at Morat, they were caught by surprise (they had field fortifications prepared, but the army was not in them, even so, the small guard at these fortifications took a terrible toll on the Swiss), and this time the Swiss were engaged as 'allies' of the leauge of Constance, and as a result had a LOT of HRE cavalry, resulting in the slaughter of at least 6000 Burgundians - a crippling, but not complete defeat.
The only time the Swiss and Burgundian field armies met in a real stand-up engagement with both armies fully prepared was at Nancy. At that point, due to the reverse at Morat, the Burgundians were outnumbered literaly 5-1 (some authors claim 10-1, but the actual numbers can be arrived at pretty closely due to surviving muster rolls and the like). Their infantry was drawn up in a 'block', in the Swiss fashion, and according to the Swiss commander "They fought long, and contested the ground stubbornly, but in the end we broke them" (and from the Swiss - THAT is a high compliment of their courage and fighting abilities). The Burgundian cavalry, now heavily outnumbered, was swept aside by leauge cavalry, although the Ducal guard made repeated charges to allow the escape of some of the army, the disaster was complete, and the Burgundians decisively defeated.
Regarding armies of the HRE in the late Middle Ages (but pre-Landesknecht). In essence they were very old fashioned, consisting of the feudal troops (organized in a 'glaive' consisting of a mounted man-at-arms and a mounted crossbowman or two - intended to fight on horseback as well as afoot, and a mounted servant). The infantry was supplied by towns, as was the largest portion of artillery, and usually there were less infantry than mounted troops (the towns acting very independently, and being more inclined to fight the feudal lords than join their armies).
The system of Landesknechts was developed by Maximilian to provide a reliable, trained infantry to the Imperial host (without relying on the towns). That they copied the Swiss model is due to the stunning success of the Swiss, rather than it being an intrinsicaly German method of fighting. That said, by 1500, they had made it the "German" method.
So until Maximilian, the German armies tended to be more cavalry heavy than Burgundian ones (as were the French). In actuality, the Burgundian armies tended to field more infantry than many continental armies (six of nine members of a lance being men who were intended to fight on foot).
In retrospect, the Burgundians often come across as doing badly by historians concentrating on their last three engagements, but prior to "duking" it out with the Leauge of Constance, the Burgundians had a very credible record of battlefield victories, winning more often than losing, although the strategic goals of campaigns were not always (an in some cases not often) met - in the end, preforming much like the English Armies of the Hundred Years War - being able to win a battlefield (the victories were rarely as stunning as Agincourt, but both the Ghent war of 1452-53, and the war with Liege ended about as decisively as you could like), but unable to consolidate gains, or hold territories won in the long run.
------------------
Bob R.
By decisive victory, I mean a battle by which the winning force so damages the enemy that they are realisticaly unable to engage him after that point (as Agincourt and Poiters were to the French)
In example Grandson - not a decisive victory for the confederates, as the entire Burgundian army disengaged relatively unscathed - due to the mass of disciplined cavalry able to counterattack to prevent the decimation of their infantry.
At Grandson, the confederates were actually losing - half their army engaged, the rest off foraging, and being manouvered into a situation where they were trapped against the lake , and pinned in place (this was effected by luring them off of a hill, and onto the plain - they were supremely arrogant in their confidence), and then pinned in place by cavalry charges - one of which punched a hole into their formation, the Swiss commander considering that to be the direst point of the battle, all the while being pecked away at by the Burgundian crossbows and hangonnes skirmishing.
What caused the loss for the Burgundians was at a critical juncture - a third of the cavalry moving to the rear of the household guard, giving the Burgundian field guns the room to move into position to batter the Swiss block to pieces. At that critical moment of manouver, the rest of the Swiss army started to filter in on the previously mentioned emminence, and in conjunction with the cavalry moving to the rear, the campfollowers saw this and shouted "Save Yourselves - all is lost", and ran away (wagoners cutting horses out of wagon traces and galloping off and the like), then the infantry caught the panick and ran. The cavalry was able to stave off the Swiss, and protect the rest of th army while it ran, and as a result, the only significant losses were the loss of the abandoned artillery, and the tents - which unfortunately for Charles were stuffed with valuables. Well under a thousand Burgundian casualties in all, and over 400 losses admitted to by the Swiss - who regularly under-reported, or did not report at all their losses.
It says much for the logistical capabilities of the Burgundians, that they were able to field as large, or larger army a few months later at Morat, with just as large an artillery park. Unfortunately for the Burgundians at Morat, they were caught by surprise (they had field fortifications prepared, but the army was not in them, even so, the small guard at these fortifications took a terrible toll on the Swiss), and this time the Swiss were engaged as 'allies' of the leauge of Constance, and as a result had a LOT of HRE cavalry, resulting in the slaughter of at least 6000 Burgundians - a crippling, but not complete defeat.
The only time the Swiss and Burgundian field armies met in a real stand-up engagement with both armies fully prepared was at Nancy. At that point, due to the reverse at Morat, the Burgundians were outnumbered literaly 5-1 (some authors claim 10-1, but the actual numbers can be arrived at pretty closely due to surviving muster rolls and the like). Their infantry was drawn up in a 'block', in the Swiss fashion, and according to the Swiss commander "They fought long, and contested the ground stubbornly, but in the end we broke them" (and from the Swiss - THAT is a high compliment of their courage and fighting abilities). The Burgundian cavalry, now heavily outnumbered, was swept aside by leauge cavalry, although the Ducal guard made repeated charges to allow the escape of some of the army, the disaster was complete, and the Burgundians decisively defeated.
Regarding armies of the HRE in the late Middle Ages (but pre-Landesknecht). In essence they were very old fashioned, consisting of the feudal troops (organized in a 'glaive' consisting of a mounted man-at-arms and a mounted crossbowman or two - intended to fight on horseback as well as afoot, and a mounted servant). The infantry was supplied by towns, as was the largest portion of artillery, and usually there were less infantry than mounted troops (the towns acting very independently, and being more inclined to fight the feudal lords than join their armies).
The system of Landesknechts was developed by Maximilian to provide a reliable, trained infantry to the Imperial host (without relying on the towns). That they copied the Swiss model is due to the stunning success of the Swiss, rather than it being an intrinsicaly German method of fighting. That said, by 1500, they had made it the "German" method.
So until Maximilian, the German armies tended to be more cavalry heavy than Burgundian ones (as were the French). In actuality, the Burgundian armies tended to field more infantry than many continental armies (six of nine members of a lance being men who were intended to fight on foot).
In retrospect, the Burgundians often come across as doing badly by historians concentrating on their last three engagements, but prior to "duking" it out with the Leauge of Constance, the Burgundians had a very credible record of battlefield victories, winning more often than losing, although the strategic goals of campaigns were not always (an in some cases not often) met - in the end, preforming much like the English Armies of the Hundred Years War - being able to win a battlefield (the victories were rarely as stunning as Agincourt, but both the Ghent war of 1452-53, and the war with Liege ended about as decisively as you could like), but unable to consolidate gains, or hold territories won in the long run.
------------------
Bob R.
<BLOCKQUOTE><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><HR><font face="Verdana, Arial" size="2">Originally posted by Abaddon:
<B>If you have ever wondered why the troops in the revolutionary war stood in long rows in the middle of an open field...now you know. They did ti because that was the way it had always been done. They did it to maximize the effectiveness of their primary weapons, the rifle...whose level of inaccuracy and pitiful reloading speed was a severe handicpa in any but the most clear feild conditions. The rifles of the day had to fired in volley so as to increase the chances that your troops would hit something. Of course it helped if your troops were packed extremely close together and concentrated their fire on the same places. Of course the act of grouping your troops close together made it easier for your oppnent to concentrate fire on you with an increased cahnce of hittiing something...but that was the tradeoff.
If your troops' discipline was better, you usually won.
Fighting in the woods was a horrible disadvantage. Since you couldn't see very far, you couldn't shoot very far, and since the rifles were so inaccurate and your troops would have a hard time grouping close enought together to fire in volley...that means that the first shot is probably going to miss. Since it took even the best trained man almots 14 seconds ot reload his rifle...and his visibility in the woods was linted to much less than the ground an enemy could cover in that time....in effect that meant that in the woods you got off only one shot, and then it was down to hand to hand combat. Discipline would be shot, and the your superiority in numbers or the quality of your gear made no difference. It became a crap shoot.
</B></font><HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
You mean the musket, don't you?
My reading says that at 70 yards, musket balls would fall harmlessly to the ground. Rifles, however, are a fine beast. Virginians loved to target practice with them. A target no larger than an orange at 250yds + was fine sport. This was very bad for the British when the Virginians got to Boston after Lexington and Concord and picked off officers and men who KNEW they were well out of range. 
Unfortunately, we lost a lot of riflemen to Brits who closed to bayonet range. We did learn, eventually, to put our own musket men with bayonets in front to cover them.
<B>If you have ever wondered why the troops in the revolutionary war stood in long rows in the middle of an open field...now you know. They did ti because that was the way it had always been done. They did it to maximize the effectiveness of their primary weapons, the rifle...whose level of inaccuracy and pitiful reloading speed was a severe handicpa in any but the most clear feild conditions. The rifles of the day had to fired in volley so as to increase the chances that your troops would hit something. Of course it helped if your troops were packed extremely close together and concentrated their fire on the same places. Of course the act of grouping your troops close together made it easier for your oppnent to concentrate fire on you with an increased cahnce of hittiing something...but that was the tradeoff.
If your troops' discipline was better, you usually won.
Fighting in the woods was a horrible disadvantage. Since you couldn't see very far, you couldn't shoot very far, and since the rifles were so inaccurate and your troops would have a hard time grouping close enought together to fire in volley...that means that the first shot is probably going to miss. Since it took even the best trained man almots 14 seconds ot reload his rifle...and his visibility in the woods was linted to much less than the ground an enemy could cover in that time....in effect that meant that in the woods you got off only one shot, and then it was down to hand to hand combat. Discipline would be shot, and the your superiority in numbers or the quality of your gear made no difference. It became a crap shoot.
</B></font><HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
You mean the musket, don't you?
My reading says that at 70 yards, musket balls would fall harmlessly to the ground. Rifles, however, are a fine beast. Virginians loved to target practice with them. A target no larger than an orange at 250yds + was fine sport. This was very bad for the British when the Virginians got to Boston after Lexington and Concord and picked off officers and men who KNEW they were well out of range. Unfortunately, we lost a lot of riflemen to Brits who closed to bayonet range. We did learn, eventually, to put our own musket men with bayonets in front to cover them.
In Ancient Greece, the phalanx of pikes ruled the battlefield, until their opponents started choosing ground that would not allow them to work effectively. Broken terrain, etc.
In real war, who wants a fair fight? I want more troops, better troops, better supplies, the best ground to fight on, and the best tactics.
In real war, who wants a fair fight? I want more troops, better troops, better supplies, the best ground to fight on, and the best tactics.
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chef de chambre
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Hi Alcyoneus,
Musket balls carried much farther than 75 yards, but to quote a British officer of the day "...that as far as 100 yards away, an individual taking individual aim is as likely to hit the moon as his target..." and that a fellow would be very unfortunate indeed to be hit by an aimed shot at that distance - the likelyhood being astronomical.
That said, the rifle was not the decisive battlefield weapon of the Revolution. It had inherent flaws, as anyone who has regularly fired, maintained, and in essence worked as an armourer on blackpowder weapons can tell you. The rifleing fouls swiftly - ten shots being about the max in the field possible with a patched roundball, after that the gun near impossible to load without cleaning. British officers commented on seeing the Virginians at Brooklyn Heights forcibly trying to ram the ramrod down their weapons, pushing them against trees and the like - only to be pinned against the trees by Hessians with their bayonetts.
The Continental army principly fought - and won the war, as organized line infantry armed with muskets, with the help of French regulars fighting as the same - contrary to popular myth. The same myth of the militiamans effectivness fighting irregularly was to cost the Americans dearly in 1812 and again at the beginning of the Civil War - the myth being finally swept away at Bull Run.
It was not until the invention and widespread use of the minne-ball system in the 1840's and 50's that the musket became obsolete - the system allowing the number of times a rifle being fired before cleaning to be trebeled.
A musket will kill a man stone dead at 100 yards. The problems you describe being due to the official desire for a rapidity of fire being of more importance than an exact aim. Think of a regiment of 800 or 1000 men armed with flintlock muskets as a short range machine gun, using the tactics of platoon firing to achive the desire of a constant ripple of fire. To achieve rapidity of fire and prevent jamming, a ball of significantly smaller diameter (usually .69 in British service, being used in a .75 caliber bore) was usually used, with a paper cartridge ripped open and stuffed into the bore as a crude wad, rather than carefully patching a ball of similar diameter to the bore, the practise of which increases the accuracy of the musket ten-fold, turing the arm from a "pumpkin-roller", to an arm that you can with regularity (8 out of ten times) hit a man sized target at 100 yards - *somewhere* on his person.
At Lexington and Concord, the swarms of militia turning the British expedition into a bloody ruinous retreat were armed unanimously with muskets - but they were, unlike the British, trained to use them for accuracy, using patched, carefully moulded and chosen (every man would cast his own) round ball, by men used to supplementing their food supply by hunting, and having the good sens (not bing proper soldiers), to use their woodcraft gained from hunting to use cover and take careful aim.
The battle shows the potential of the musket in hands trained to use them as weapons of accuracy. It did the same fellows no good, as amature soldiers in NY a year later, meeting the same professionals on the open field (Lexington & Concord had been one, long ambush)as the had to, their very attributes as marksmen (made them slow to load and fire), and a lack of being trained to fight in disciplened formations made for an asy victory for the British, who only had to endure a couple of aimed volleys before setting on the undisciplened mass with bayonetts - to the ruin of the Americans.
The Americans, with the exeption of Lexington and Concord, won their battles when they learned to be regulars (they always had the potential for aimed fire over their foes - during the war of 1812, th British accused the American Marines of being armed with rifles due to their horrifically accurate fire in ship-to-ship battles. They were not, they were taught to carefully aim - as they still are today), and were battered in defeats before the lesson was learned.
Oftn the British during the early days of the Revolution thought they were facing rifle-armed Americans due to the accuracy of their fire, when in fact they were just facing trained marksmen with weapons similar to their own, who just knew how to maximize the potential of their weapons - but unfortunately for themselves hadn't learnd how to be proper soldiers yet. They often had no bayonettes, and those who had them, did not know how to use them, until a fellow named von Steuben came along.
------------------
Bob R.
Musket balls carried much farther than 75 yards, but to quote a British officer of the day "...that as far as 100 yards away, an individual taking individual aim is as likely to hit the moon as his target..." and that a fellow would be very unfortunate indeed to be hit by an aimed shot at that distance - the likelyhood being astronomical.
That said, the rifle was not the decisive battlefield weapon of the Revolution. It had inherent flaws, as anyone who has regularly fired, maintained, and in essence worked as an armourer on blackpowder weapons can tell you. The rifleing fouls swiftly - ten shots being about the max in the field possible with a patched roundball, after that the gun near impossible to load without cleaning. British officers commented on seeing the Virginians at Brooklyn Heights forcibly trying to ram the ramrod down their weapons, pushing them against trees and the like - only to be pinned against the trees by Hessians with their bayonetts.
The Continental army principly fought - and won the war, as organized line infantry armed with muskets, with the help of French regulars fighting as the same - contrary to popular myth. The same myth of the militiamans effectivness fighting irregularly was to cost the Americans dearly in 1812 and again at the beginning of the Civil War - the myth being finally swept away at Bull Run.
It was not until the invention and widespread use of the minne-ball system in the 1840's and 50's that the musket became obsolete - the system allowing the number of times a rifle being fired before cleaning to be trebeled.
A musket will kill a man stone dead at 100 yards. The problems you describe being due to the official desire for a rapidity of fire being of more importance than an exact aim. Think of a regiment of 800 or 1000 men armed with flintlock muskets as a short range machine gun, using the tactics of platoon firing to achive the desire of a constant ripple of fire. To achieve rapidity of fire and prevent jamming, a ball of significantly smaller diameter (usually .69 in British service, being used in a .75 caliber bore) was usually used, with a paper cartridge ripped open and stuffed into the bore as a crude wad, rather than carefully patching a ball of similar diameter to the bore, the practise of which increases the accuracy of the musket ten-fold, turing the arm from a "pumpkin-roller", to an arm that you can with regularity (8 out of ten times) hit a man sized target at 100 yards - *somewhere* on his person.
At Lexington and Concord, the swarms of militia turning the British expedition into a bloody ruinous retreat were armed unanimously with muskets - but they were, unlike the British, trained to use them for accuracy, using patched, carefully moulded and chosen (every man would cast his own) round ball, by men used to supplementing their food supply by hunting, and having the good sens (not bing proper soldiers), to use their woodcraft gained from hunting to use cover and take careful aim.
The battle shows the potential of the musket in hands trained to use them as weapons of accuracy. It did the same fellows no good, as amature soldiers in NY a year later, meeting the same professionals on the open field (Lexington & Concord had been one, long ambush)as the had to, their very attributes as marksmen (made them slow to load and fire), and a lack of being trained to fight in disciplened formations made for an asy victory for the British, who only had to endure a couple of aimed volleys before setting on the undisciplened mass with bayonetts - to the ruin of the Americans.
The Americans, with the exeption of Lexington and Concord, won their battles when they learned to be regulars (they always had the potential for aimed fire over their foes - during the war of 1812, th British accused the American Marines of being armed with rifles due to their horrifically accurate fire in ship-to-ship battles. They were not, they were taught to carefully aim - as they still are today), and were battered in defeats before the lesson was learned.
Oftn the British during the early days of the Revolution thought they were facing rifle-armed Americans due to the accuracy of their fire, when in fact they were just facing trained marksmen with weapons similar to their own, who just knew how to maximize the potential of their weapons - but unfortunately for themselves hadn't learnd how to be proper soldiers yet. They often had no bayonettes, and those who had them, did not know how to use them, until a fellow named von Steuben came along.
------------------
Bob R.
You guys are thinking tactics rather than logistics and politics and culture.
The standing infantry army does not disappear because people suddenly lost the inclination or knowledge of how to use them. They disappear because of the threat they represent (i.e. the standing army can become a tool of the monarch to supress the nobility or a tool of the nobility to overthrow the monarch), the effort it takes to support them (taxes are, inevitably, involved), and the culture that supplanted the Roman Empire (in the West) was predisposed towards a different social and political organization [one that the Romans were always pretty close to, but that's a different subject altogether].
Cavalry was pretty damn effective for many reasons. The warriors who made up the cavalry were members of a professional warrior class. The mobility of the cavalry allowed them to move rapidly in response to the appearance of threatening forces and the ability to strike deep and fast. A horse may not charge into a wall of pikes (the jury is still debating this point, but horses are pretty smart) but it will (according to the horse-policemen I've talked to) charge into a wall of men.
As early as the 11th Century this system starts to show some cracks. When William the Conqueror summoned the fuedal levies, on one occasion, he confiscated the money they were required to bring with them for their upkeep and used that money to hire mercenaries. The levies he sent home. As time went on the putative 'warrior class' became separated (to varying degrees) from their military origins. At the same time Europe developed an advanced economic system that made it possible to keep large bodies of troops in the field for extended periods of time. More than that, the consolidation of power into fewer hands meant that it was possible to prosecute long-term conflicts.
All of which combines to degrade the effectiveness of the cavalry and increase the effectiveness of the other branches. The idea of stirrup-equipped heavy cavalry suddenly becoming capable of over-running disciplined infantry units is erroneous. The stirrup did allow heavy cavalry units to press home a charge more effectively, but heavy cavalry units had already performed such feats (without stirrups) in the Near East.
The cavalry of the Middle Ages was always enourmously effective. It was also, frequently, misused. Cavalry making frontal charges against dismounted forces in prepared defensive positions are meat. But the smart commander doesn't charge the defensive positions headlong, he uses mobility to bypass and engaged the rear, the baggage train, a flank, a line of supply or just about anything but stakes and pikes. The smart commander uses mobility and raids: burning, pillaging, devestating and moving faster than the defender can raise a force to provide an effective defense. The smart commander dismounts the enormously-skilled professional warriors who make up the bulk of his cavalry and uses them to stiffen his defenses when forced to defend a position. He might even use them as shock troops when storming a castle. Cavalry is particularly useful during the pursuit portion of a battle (as many of you have pointed out). Even after the advent of gunpowder cavalry remained effective (unless you wanted them to charge troops in defensive pos.... never mind).
The standing infantry army does not disappear because people suddenly lost the inclination or knowledge of how to use them. They disappear because of the threat they represent (i.e. the standing army can become a tool of the monarch to supress the nobility or a tool of the nobility to overthrow the monarch), the effort it takes to support them (taxes are, inevitably, involved), and the culture that supplanted the Roman Empire (in the West) was predisposed towards a different social and political organization [one that the Romans were always pretty close to, but that's a different subject altogether].
Cavalry was pretty damn effective for many reasons. The warriors who made up the cavalry were members of a professional warrior class. The mobility of the cavalry allowed them to move rapidly in response to the appearance of threatening forces and the ability to strike deep and fast. A horse may not charge into a wall of pikes (the jury is still debating this point, but horses are pretty smart) but it will (according to the horse-policemen I've talked to) charge into a wall of men.
As early as the 11th Century this system starts to show some cracks. When William the Conqueror summoned the fuedal levies, on one occasion, he confiscated the money they were required to bring with them for their upkeep and used that money to hire mercenaries. The levies he sent home. As time went on the putative 'warrior class' became separated (to varying degrees) from their military origins. At the same time Europe developed an advanced economic system that made it possible to keep large bodies of troops in the field for extended periods of time. More than that, the consolidation of power into fewer hands meant that it was possible to prosecute long-term conflicts.
All of which combines to degrade the effectiveness of the cavalry and increase the effectiveness of the other branches. The idea of stirrup-equipped heavy cavalry suddenly becoming capable of over-running disciplined infantry units is erroneous. The stirrup did allow heavy cavalry units to press home a charge more effectively, but heavy cavalry units had already performed such feats (without stirrups) in the Near East.
The cavalry of the Middle Ages was always enourmously effective. It was also, frequently, misused. Cavalry making frontal charges against dismounted forces in prepared defensive positions are meat. But the smart commander doesn't charge the defensive positions headlong, he uses mobility to bypass and engaged the rear, the baggage train, a flank, a line of supply or just about anything but stakes and pikes. The smart commander uses mobility and raids: burning, pillaging, devestating and moving faster than the defender can raise a force to provide an effective defense. The smart commander dismounts the enormously-skilled professional warriors who make up the bulk of his cavalry and uses them to stiffen his defenses when forced to defend a position. He might even use them as shock troops when storming a castle. Cavalry is particularly useful during the pursuit portion of a battle (as many of you have pointed out). Even after the advent of gunpowder cavalry remained effective (unless you wanted them to charge troops in defensive pos.... never mind).
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chef de chambre
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Hi Jester,
Absolutely. Armies, the way they are raised, and the weapons and tactics that ar used, type of warfare engaged in is based upon the Society itself, how it is organized, how capable whoever raising an army is regarding the ability to fund, and maintain it, sizes of armies are dictated by the logistical capabilities of whoever is raising them, etc.
In the modern world, we look at hardware, and unless you understand the limitations, asperations, and values of a Society, many people can't understand these limitations, and ask 'well, why didn't they do X?'.
The Feudal system was a means of a not very centeralized and organized government, with extremely limited abilities to levy taxes effectively (during the years when coin was available for the purpose), and limited technology to raise the most effective force possibe;, and it was done by organizing the society for war, with a warrior elite recieving land and people to support themselves and train for war in exchange for military service. The cracks were wide open at the end of the 12th and beginning of the 13th centi=uries when we find in England John's Barrons refusing to do military service to hold the rest of the Angevan Empire, putting forward the excuses that their manors were going untended - they had become more concerned with administering their estates and ammassing wealth, than in preforming the very services they were given their land and position to be able to fulfil.
People often wonder at the small size of Medieval armies, but it wasn't until late in the 16h century, and truely into the 17th century that governments became centeralized enough, with enough infrastructure to supply armies with cash, food, and the 'sinews of war' to break through the glass ceiling of armies of about 25,000.
Infantry armies need a certain level of centeralization of government to be able to give them the required training and discipline to be able to stand up to heavy cavalry. The Anglo-Saxons had happened to organize their kingdom (in the end one) to be able to raise armies of effective infantry - the Normans came in and took apart their social structure and reorganized it to the model of providing the knight, and so the last kingdom in the West capable of doing this until towns and cities provided the neccessary capabilities in the 13th & 14th centuries on a limited scale. Byzantium was in essence the last European power to be able to raise professional armies, and their capabilities declined across the course of the High and Late Middle Ages, till by the end, they were saddled with a system of efeoffed warriors as well. Of course by the time they were gone, the Swiss and the English had been feilding largely infantry armies with specialized weapons for over 100 years.
On the other hand Jester, this is crashingly dull to most people - it is the "shiney bits" - the hardware, that catches the attention. Nobody wants to read Spufford on 'Money and it's use in the Middle Ages', or anything like it if they can help it.
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Bob R.
Absolutely. Armies, the way they are raised, and the weapons and tactics that ar used, type of warfare engaged in is based upon the Society itself, how it is organized, how capable whoever raising an army is regarding the ability to fund, and maintain it, sizes of armies are dictated by the logistical capabilities of whoever is raising them, etc.
In the modern world, we look at hardware, and unless you understand the limitations, asperations, and values of a Society, many people can't understand these limitations, and ask 'well, why didn't they do X?'.
The Feudal system was a means of a not very centeralized and organized government, with extremely limited abilities to levy taxes effectively (during the years when coin was available for the purpose), and limited technology to raise the most effective force possibe;, and it was done by organizing the society for war, with a warrior elite recieving land and people to support themselves and train for war in exchange for military service. The cracks were wide open at the end of the 12th and beginning of the 13th centi=uries when we find in England John's Barrons refusing to do military service to hold the rest of the Angevan Empire, putting forward the excuses that their manors were going untended - they had become more concerned with administering their estates and ammassing wealth, than in preforming the very services they were given their land and position to be able to fulfil.
People often wonder at the small size of Medieval armies, but it wasn't until late in the 16h century, and truely into the 17th century that governments became centeralized enough, with enough infrastructure to supply armies with cash, food, and the 'sinews of war' to break through the glass ceiling of armies of about 25,000.
Infantry armies need a certain level of centeralization of government to be able to give them the required training and discipline to be able to stand up to heavy cavalry. The Anglo-Saxons had happened to organize their kingdom (in the end one) to be able to raise armies of effective infantry - the Normans came in and took apart their social structure and reorganized it to the model of providing the knight, and so the last kingdom in the West capable of doing this until towns and cities provided the neccessary capabilities in the 13th & 14th centuries on a limited scale. Byzantium was in essence the last European power to be able to raise professional armies, and their capabilities declined across the course of the High and Late Middle Ages, till by the end, they were saddled with a system of efeoffed warriors as well. Of course by the time they were gone, the Swiss and the English had been feilding largely infantry armies with specialized weapons for over 100 years.
On the other hand Jester, this is crashingly dull to most people - it is the "shiney bits" - the hardware, that catches the attention. Nobody wants to read Spufford on 'Money and it's use in the Middle Ages', or anything like it if they can help it.
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Bob R.
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Guest
Jester and Bob,
I agree with both of you completely that the makeup of the armies was dictated by social and economic reasons. I suppose i should have said something about them to explain why a professional heavy infantry wasn't available and the coressponding increase in the power of the heavy cavalry, but i was trying to keep my responses from getting too long. Oh, and Jester, I'm not sure if your comment regarding stirrups was in response to my mention of that particular theory, but I want to clarify that i hold the same opinion that you do. The stirrup made the cavalry more dangerous, but it didn't make them superior to properly armed, well trained heavy infantry.
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Otto von Aachen
Kingdom of the Outlands, Canton of Hawks Hollow
I agree with both of you completely that the makeup of the armies was dictated by social and economic reasons. I suppose i should have said something about them to explain why a professional heavy infantry wasn't available and the coressponding increase in the power of the heavy cavalry, but i was trying to keep my responses from getting too long. Oh, and Jester, I'm not sure if your comment regarding stirrups was in response to my mention of that particular theory, but I want to clarify that i hold the same opinion that you do. The stirrup made the cavalry more dangerous, but it didn't make them superior to properly armed, well trained heavy infantry.
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Otto von Aachen
Kingdom of the Outlands, Canton of Hawks Hollow
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FrauHirsch
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<BLOCKQUOTE><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><HR><font face="Verdana, Arial" size="2">Originally posted by chef de chambre:
<B>To achieve rapidity of fire and prevent jamming, a ball of significantly smaller diameter (usually .69 in British service, being used in a .75 caliber bore)
</B></font><HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
It is my understanding that rifled barrels for military use are post period. In period we are talking about smooth bore. They did use a smaller ball as Chef describes, rapid fire being important. One can see early 16th c German Ritters with up to 6 wheellock pistols tucked about the body and saddle and the handgonners on foot with bandoleers of apostles. This was all about rapid fire. When against large numbers accuracy is not so important. Just like archery volley fire, which I'm sure the gunners tactics evolved from.
In Germany I read once that Schutzenfests had archery, crossbow and gun competitions and the crossbow always won until something like 1670 when rifling was first used in the competition. A friend of mine had a book on Schutzenfests. This was also mentioned in various museum exhibits in Germany.
Juliana
<B>To achieve rapidity of fire and prevent jamming, a ball of significantly smaller diameter (usually .69 in British service, being used in a .75 caliber bore)
</B></font><HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
It is my understanding that rifled barrels for military use are post period. In period we are talking about smooth bore. They did use a smaller ball as Chef describes, rapid fire being important. One can see early 16th c German Ritters with up to 6 wheellock pistols tucked about the body and saddle and the handgonners on foot with bandoleers of apostles. This was all about rapid fire. When against large numbers accuracy is not so important. Just like archery volley fire, which I'm sure the gunners tactics evolved from.
In Germany I read once that Schutzenfests had archery, crossbow and gun competitions and the crossbow always won until something like 1670 when rifling was first used in the competition. A friend of mine had a book on Schutzenfests. This was also mentioned in various museum exhibits in Germany.
Juliana
I'm not at home, so I don't have my references available, so this isn't guaranteed accurate.
I think that rifling originated around 1575, and was straight. The thought was that it would make it easier to clean the barrels. Sometime after that, it was modified to a spiral, and eventually they figured out that the spin would help the accuracy. I'm not entirely sure when that happened, but if it works for arrows, it would be a pretty simple logical developement.
Leonardo da Vinci is supposed to have used a gun of his own design (I'm betting on a rifle) to pick off enemy troops at 300 yards during a siege he was involved in.
I think that rifling originated around 1575, and was straight. The thought was that it would make it easier to clean the barrels. Sometime after that, it was modified to a spiral, and eventually they figured out that the spin would help the accuracy. I'm not entirely sure when that happened, but if it works for arrows, it would be a pretty simple logical developement.
Leonardo da Vinci is supposed to have used a gun of his own design (I'm betting on a rifle) to pick off enemy troops at 300 yards during a siege he was involved in.
Jester said:
In truth, the horses aim at the openings. I recommend the Discovery series "The Warhorse" they spend a good deal of time discussing a horse's psychology and proving the above with the help of the British mounted police. He gallops with the herd and aims for the open spaces he sees in the "wall of men." HOWEVER, also consider the psychological effect on horses charging on you and your buddies standing there--I bet some holes do open up
Ace
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I drink champagne when I'm happy and when I'm sad. Sometimes I drink when I'm alone. When I have company I consider it obligatory. I trifle with it if I'm not hungry and drink it when I am. Otherwise I never touch it--unless I'm thirsty.
<font face="Verdana, Arial" size="2">A horse may not charge into a wall of pikes (the jury is still debating this point, but horses are pretty smart) but it will (according to the horse-policemen I've talked to) charge into a wall of men.</font>
In truth, the horses aim at the openings. I recommend the Discovery series "The Warhorse" they spend a good deal of time discussing a horse's psychology and proving the above with the help of the British mounted police. He gallops with the herd and aims for the open spaces he sees in the "wall of men." HOWEVER, also consider the psychological effect on horses charging on you and your buddies standing there--I bet some holes do open up
Ace
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I drink champagne when I'm happy and when I'm sad. Sometimes I drink when I'm alone. When I have company I consider it obligatory. I trifle with it if I'm not hungry and drink it when I am. Otherwise I never touch it--unless I'm thirsty.
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JJ Shred
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Acelynn, have you ever broken a green 3 or 4 year old colt? One of the hardest things is to get up the nerve to "charge" into the horse when it is standing on its hind legs and kicking with the front. Experienced horsemen know this is a bluff, or display, and you establish dominance by attacking instead of retreating. The normal reaction is to back out of danger but in horse language, that signifies submission. I had trouble with this the first time until the horse charged Patty, and instincts kicked in where I was angrier the afraid. But that first time is always the toughest, and I think that many here on this forum who claim to be able to stand up to a mounted knight would quickly lose their nerve when 1500 lbs rose up and started boxing at head level with steel-shod hooves. They just haven't experienced it yet.
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chef de chambre
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Hi Acelynn,
Excellent points regarding horse and human psychology. As to what a horse can and cannot do regarding a pike-block, that is highly dependant on a huge number of factors and the individual capabilities of horse and rider. As a general rule, pike block beats horse - rock/paper/scissors
But to give a contrary example, I will proffer the example of Louis Chalon-Chateugueyon at Grandson. With 'curb and spur' and a large and powerful grey charger, he lept the first three ranks of leveled pikes - presumably he was riding a covered mount as it was not killed or mortally wounded at that insance. This action was catastrophic to the Swiss block - now they had a horseman loose in thier midst who had managed to punch a hole in the middle of their formation - unfortunately for Louis, he was followed by very few men to drive the charge home (less than a half dozen at most). He penetrated as far as the banners, which were located in the precise center of the formation, but was killed (as he laid hands on one cantons banner - I used to think Berne, but in rereading recently it may have been Schwytz or Uri) when his horse was brought down mortally wounded, and he was dispatched by two named confederates, one armed with a half-pike, the other with a halberd.
The Swiss commander in writing back to the great council of Berne said that it was the most critical point of the battle, but that God had delivered them. The few men who had followed Louis were quickley killed, and the breech was plugged.
What most likely happend, when considering modern studies such as you mentioned is that when Louis and his horse preformed this feat, the horses immediately to his side and rear followed into the gap -wreaking temporary havoc, while the horses in the rest of the Burgundian squadrons behaved in textbook normal fashion. According to the Swiss, they lost 30 men killed of the 400 admitted losses during this brief struggle - that is a lot of casualties to be inflicted in a few moments time by a handful of men. Most likely, had the formation penetrated been composed of any other troops than the Swiss, it would probably have collapsed, rather than being able to repair the damage - looking at the track records of units suffering interpenetration of a catastrophic nature from the Renaissance up to the Napoleonic Wars, collapse of the formation inevitably occurs.
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Bob R.
Excellent points regarding horse and human psychology. As to what a horse can and cannot do regarding a pike-block, that is highly dependant on a huge number of factors and the individual capabilities of horse and rider. As a general rule, pike block beats horse - rock/paper/scissors
But to give a contrary example, I will proffer the example of Louis Chalon-Chateugueyon at Grandson. With 'curb and spur' and a large and powerful grey charger, he lept the first three ranks of leveled pikes - presumably he was riding a covered mount as it was not killed or mortally wounded at that insance. This action was catastrophic to the Swiss block - now they had a horseman loose in thier midst who had managed to punch a hole in the middle of their formation - unfortunately for Louis, he was followed by very few men to drive the charge home (less than a half dozen at most). He penetrated as far as the banners, which were located in the precise center of the formation, but was killed (as he laid hands on one cantons banner - I used to think Berne, but in rereading recently it may have been Schwytz or Uri) when his horse was brought down mortally wounded, and he was dispatched by two named confederates, one armed with a half-pike, the other with a halberd.
The Swiss commander in writing back to the great council of Berne said that it was the most critical point of the battle, but that God had delivered them. The few men who had followed Louis were quickley killed, and the breech was plugged.
What most likely happend, when considering modern studies such as you mentioned is that when Louis and his horse preformed this feat, the horses immediately to his side and rear followed into the gap -wreaking temporary havoc, while the horses in the rest of the Burgundian squadrons behaved in textbook normal fashion. According to the Swiss, they lost 30 men killed of the 400 admitted losses during this brief struggle - that is a lot of casualties to be inflicted in a few moments time by a handful of men. Most likely, had the formation penetrated been composed of any other troops than the Swiss, it would probably have collapsed, rather than being able to repair the damage - looking at the track records of units suffering interpenetration of a catastrophic nature from the Renaissance up to the Napoleonic Wars, collapse of the formation inevitably occurs.
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Bob R.
Bascot said:
Bah, done that plenty of times and been really pissed off at idiots who don't handle their foals and sell them off as mostly wild yearling to three year olds. I have a bad streak of stupid bravery when it comes to horses acting up--too many years as a professional running barns full of stallions who spent the off season breeding--most people aren't that brave or stupid.
And I think Chef kind of proves the point about horses and holes in a wall--be it men with pikes or a fence or a canyon wall. Some horses will perform outside of the norm in a given situation---usually due to a rechanneled fight or flight instinct or a highly developed rapport and trust in their rider. I once owned a mare who was terrifed of everything but once I got her to trust me and believe I would take care of her, she was a brilliant performer in the ring even through she was absolutely terrified. I would venture a guess that Louis Chalon-Chateugueyon was a fine equestrian and had damn fine mount.
Ace
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"When I'm old, I don't want them to say of me,
"She's so charming." I want them to say, "Be careful, I think she's
armed." ---= G. Stoddart
<font face="Verdana, Arial" size="2">Acelynn, have you ever broken a green 3 or 4 year old colt? One of the hardest things is to get up the nerve to "charge" into the horse when it is standing on its hind legs and kicking with the front. Experienced horsemen know this is a bluff, or display, and you establish dominance by attacking instead of retreating. The normal reaction is to back out of danger but in horse language, that signifies submission. I had trouble with this the first time until the horse charged Patty, and instincts kicked in where I was angrier the afraid.</font>
Bah, done that plenty of times and been really pissed off at idiots who don't handle their foals and sell them off as mostly wild yearling to three year olds.
I have a bad streak of stupid bravery when it comes to horses acting up--too many years as a professional running barns full of stallions who spent the off season breeding--most people aren't that brave or stupid. And I think Chef kind of proves the point about horses and holes in a wall--be it men with pikes or a fence or a canyon wall. Some horses will perform outside of the norm in a given situation---usually due to a rechanneled fight or flight instinct or a highly developed rapport and trust in their rider. I once owned a mare who was terrifed of everything but once I got her to trust me and believe I would take care of her, she was a brilliant performer in the ring even through she was absolutely terrified. I would venture a guess that Louis Chalon-Chateugueyon was a fine equestrian and had damn fine mount.
Ace
------------------
"When I'm old, I don't want them to say of me,
"She's so charming." I want them to say, "Be careful, I think she's
armed." ---= G. Stoddart
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chef de chambre
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Hi Acelynn,
Yes. He belongd to the princely line of the house of Orange, and he was a friend from childhood of Charles the Bold. He had said of him that he was the most promising young knight of his generation, plus he had oodles of cash for the best equipment - the horse was noted as being exceptional.
As a knight, he was brilliant. As a unit commander he was sub-par.
From what we can learn about Charles other plans of battle, it is highly dubious he intended for the cavalry to charge home against such an obstical, in point of fact, from the course of the battle he intended to manouver the Swiss against the lake, and pin them there with a lake to their back. The charges from the course of every other disciplined, repeated charge made that day not driven home against the Swiss was to prevent the Swiss from making an offensive action with the pike block - to pin them in place on the defense, and to draw up the artillery to blow them to bits. It was similar to a skirmish post the battle of Neuss where he pinned and slaughtered an aggressive force from the imperial camp against a river, and cut down @ 6,000 - who were cut off from escaping to their camp.
Louis gambit would have won the battle if it were possible to follow it up, but the odds against the gambit succeeding were almost astronomical - he is like the fellow who won a 100 million dollar lottery, only to be struck dead by lightning on being presented with the check.
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Bob R.
Yes. He belongd to the princely line of the house of Orange, and he was a friend from childhood of Charles the Bold. He had said of him that he was the most promising young knight of his generation, plus he had oodles of cash for the best equipment - the horse was noted as being exceptional.
As a knight, he was brilliant. As a unit commander he was sub-par.
From what we can learn about Charles other plans of battle, it is highly dubious he intended for the cavalry to charge home against such an obstical, in point of fact, from the course of the battle he intended to manouver the Swiss against the lake, and pin them there with a lake to their back. The charges from the course of every other disciplined, repeated charge made that day not driven home against the Swiss was to prevent the Swiss from making an offensive action with the pike block - to pin them in place on the defense, and to draw up the artillery to blow them to bits. It was similar to a skirmish post the battle of Neuss where he pinned and slaughtered an aggressive force from the imperial camp against a river, and cut down @ 6,000 - who were cut off from escaping to their camp.
Louis gambit would have won the battle if it were possible to follow it up, but the odds against the gambit succeeding were almost astronomical - he is like the fellow who won a 100 million dollar lottery, only to be struck dead by lightning on being presented with the check.
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Bob R.